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Commentaries and Replies
On “The Lure of Strike”
Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Major General, USAF (Ret.)
This commentary is in response to the special commentary, “The Lure of Strike” by
Conrad Crane published in the Summer 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2).

A

s an admirer of Dr. Conrad Crane, it genuinely saddens me
to see his new essay, “The Lure of Strike.” Here we have a
distinguished historian becoming, in essence, an “interservice
hit man,” and chief spokesperson for the Army’s small but burgeoning
neo-Luddite wing. Regrettably, his essay sounds too much like that of a
1930’s cavalryman fulminating against the internal combustion that was
altering the way the Army would fight wars.
Dr. Crane starts by expressing the belief that because of what he
seems to think is a nefarious Air Force, America suffers from the delusion that technology inevitably produces what he calls “short, tidy wars
with limited landpower commitments.” Where he gets this notion isn’t
clear. The Air Force, which sandwiched a decade of no-fly zone enforcement marked by hundreds of Iraqi anti-aircraft engagements between
years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, certainly does not view conflict
that way. Nor does the general public, whose rejection of stand-off
strikes against Syria is ample evidence that it has no illusions about the
potential unintended consequences of any use of force.
Regardless, defending Army force structure is plainly the raison d’être
of Crane’s piece. Indeed, “The Lure of Strike” is reducible to a simple
syllogism: if technological developments allow for “short, tidy wars with
limited landpower commitments” then that will inevitably mean (in his
thinking) a smaller Army. To him, a smaller Army is, ipso facto, bad.
Ergo, technology is bad. Classic Neo-Ludditism.
Exactly why Dr. Crane is not advocating that the Army develop its
own method for conducting “short, tidy wars with limited landpower
commitments” is also unclear. After all, such conflicts would limit the
risk to America’s most precious resource: her sons and daughters and,
particularly, those in Army uniforms. It is especially baffling given that
a weary Army is just emerging from exactly the opposite: long, untidy
wars with massive manpower commitments that produced results most
charitably described by Army Colonel Gian Gentile as “unsatisfying.”
Unfortunately, Dr. Crane does not attempt to bring to bear his
formidable skills as a historian to address some of the very questions
that have spurred the nation’s search for the technology-based alternatives that he rails against. For example, why is it that the best-trained,
best-equipped, and most valorous army in the history of warfare was,
nevertheless, unable to fully defeat the largely uneducated and lightlyarmed tribesmen it significantly outnumbered and wildly outgunned?
Moreover, why did the Army, as it implemented its manpowerintensive strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, ignore a fundamental lesson
of COIN history, that is, that the most powerful insurgent recruitment
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tool is not, as some narratives would have it, the use of high-technology
means (such as stand-off strike), but rather the physical presence of
foreign troops? Should not the Army ask itself why its leaders repeatedly characterized its warfighting mission as “protecting the Afghan
(or Iraqi) people” when the actual assignment was about protecting the
American people as Congress’ Authorization to Use Military Force made
crystal clear?
And even among those Soldiers who did grasp the true mission,
why did so many think that the way to go about it was to try to turn
infantrymen armed with high school degrees into social workers, civil
engineers, nurses, schoolteachers, and boy scouts as Dr. Crane’s COIN
doctrine importuned? And then give them the Sisyphean task to transform hostile, ancient cultures into pacific, Westernized societies? Even
if that scheme somehow could work, did they not realize that al Qaeda
would easily outflank it by decamping to Pakistan, Yemen, and North
Africa—not to mention burrowing into urban areas around the globe?
Instead of grappling with those substantive questions of recent
history, Dr. Crane launches a lengthy and startlingly venomous attack on
America’s most high-tech force, the United States Air Force. According
to Crane, not only does airpower fail at every turn, it is Airmen who
are disingenuously and deceptively corrupting the national security dialogue. Of course, these hackneyed myths have been rebutted repeatedly,
but picking apart the many flaws and omissions in Dr. Crane’s rendition is actually unnecessary. In fact, his essay amply illustrates the limits
of the historian’s art when it comes to the technology of war. It really
doesn’t matter, for example, what airpower could or could not do during
World War II or, for that matter, yesterday, as the only thing that really
counts is what it can do today.
And that is plenty. As the President and others have come to learn
from material found in bin Laden’s lair and elsewhere, what America’s
most dangerous enemies fear the most is not chai-drinking soldiers,
female engagement teams, or even masses of infantrymen lumbering
about in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, but rather being
relentlessly hunted by high-tech surveillance and strike platforms.
Of course, no one believes that stand-off, precision strike is always
the answer, but—sometimes—it can be. As Tom Ricks’s book Fiasco
reports, 1998’s Operation Desert Fox—a few days of air and missile
strikes—effectively ended Iraq’s nuclear weapons’ program. David
Kay, the former United Nations arms inspector, said that after the
strikes the Iraqi weapons programs “withered away, and never got
momentum again.”
America is a technological nation, and the Army ought to embrace
and celebrate that fact even if it means changes. Yet as a developer of
robotic ground vehicles told The New York Times, “there is a resistance to
new technologies being introduced in and around soldiers.” Although
infantrymen are hardly obsolete, their numbers and employment strategy is—and should be—reevaluated because of what technology can
now offer.
The Army needs to calm itself. Everyone whose opinions anyone
should care about knows America needs a robust and dominant Army.
There is, in fact, a powerful case to be made for such an Army, but it
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is not one premised on denigrating another service, or—especially—
suggesting that technology does not and cannot change the calculus of
warfighting. In short, our Army must resist “the lure of Neo-Ludditism.”

The Author Replies
Conrad C. Crane

I

assume that MG Dunlap, like myself, was under a time crunch to
get his submission into the journal, so I will accept the possibility
that he might not have had time to read my article thoroughly. After
acknowledging the important role of airpower in the American Way of
War, my intent was to ensure policymakers do not expect too much of it.
They must retain the full range of capabilities of the joint force to keep
all military options open. As has been apparent in recent Congressional
testimony by the service chiefs, they are all concerned that precipitous
cuts in force structure will threaten capabilities necessary to preserve
national security. I am equally concerned about exorbitant claims that
cyber capabilities will be able to plug the gaps.
I was rather appalled by MG Dunlap’s assault on the Army’s record
in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is not enough space in this issue to allow
me to address that in much detail. While that might be a topic worth a
full issue of the Quarterly in the future, it will also be debated in a wave
of historical works to come. Much of his opinion is rooted in his wellknown opposition to FM 3-24, and the counterinsurgency operations it
proposed. He makes the common error of attacking the tool of COIN,
rather than the strategies and policies it supported. Decisionmakers
need to have a full toolbox to address security interests. Sometimes
necessary approaches will be highly kinetic, but MG Dunlap’s disdain
for nonkinetic solutions is apparent. He remains convinced you can
fight these kinds of wars from 20,000 feet. He argues that large land
force presence always has a self-defeating backlash, ignoring the fact
that the Afghan president’s most vociferous complaints to commanders
were about the perceived excesses of airpower, not too many Soldiers
or Marines. No topic causes more concern among the international
students at the Army War College than the issue of drone strikes, which
might be good counterterrorism for us, but are often detrimental to
counterinsurgency efforts in targeted countries, and can create more
enemies in the long run.
I must agree with MG Dunlap that the widespread reluctance to
engage in air attacks against Syria is a positive sign that the limitations
of technology are being considered by decision makers, though the full
scenario has still to unfold. At the same time the complexity of that
situation, and these recognized technological shortcomings, highlight
the necessity for a wide range of options to be available for policy
makers. Meaningful land force commitments are obviously a last resort,
but having that capability reassures allies, gives adversaries pause, and
adds to the menu of possible solutions to apply to difficult problem sets,
especially as potential allies also reduce their military force structure
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and the world becomes more urbanized. Advanced technology remains
an important part of that national security equation, and America has to
retain that asymmetric edge. Sometimes a few bombs or a few electrons
will be enough to accomplish national objectives. But when they are not,
there must be other tools in the military toolkit. Sometimes boots on the
ground will be necessary.

On “Women in Battle”
Sarah Percy
This commentary is in response to the featured articles “The Female Soldier” by Anthony
C. King; “What Women Bring to the Fight” by Ellen L. Haring; and “Gender
Perspectives and Fighting” by Robert Egnell published in the Summer 2013 issue of
Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2).

T

he thought-provoking Summer 2013 issue of Parameters examines
the integration of women in combat roles. The essays by Ellen
Haring, Anthony King, and Robert Egnell make a number of
valuable contributions to our understanding of the challenges of placing
women in combat. As always, there are areas that could be further
explored, and I would like to offer three.
First, it is worth considering that the decision to put women in
combat roles came about gradually, but is still extraordinary. It differs
from decisions to integrate other types of previously excluded groups.
Examining how and why this revolutionary change took place at an
evolutionary pace leads us to two more interest areas for further research
concerning the relationship between gender and the military, and the
changing nature of war.
Joshua Goldstein, in his definitive book War and Gender (Cambridge
2001), reveals that, across culture and across history, women have never
played a significant role in combat at any stage before the twentieth
century; even during the World Wars, they performed limited combat
roles. In short, states have developed a tradition and history of warfare
that has excluded women, and by placing women in combat roles states
are reversing hundreds of years of history and cultural practice.
In this way, the integration of women into combat roles differs
considerably from racial integration and the gradual acceptance of open
homosexuality in the military, discussed by all three authors. Every race
in the world has fought wars and been in combat. Racial integration may
have caused (or been perceived to have caused) issues surrounding unit
cohesion but both historical evidence and the practical experience of
soldiers fighting against soldiers of other races suggested that race was
not an obstacle to effective combat.
Likewise, the increasing acceptance of homosexuality in the American
services differs from female combat integration. Homosexuality has
never been a bar to effective combat (and famously in some cultures
homosexuality is part of the warrior ethos). There have always been
gay and nonwhite troops, but quite simply, until recent years there have
almost never been women. King discusses how women may still challenge unit cohesion because of problems created by sexual relationships
between soldiers. This, of course, has also been true of homosexuality.
While women will face broader challenges because they have rarely been
used as combat troops, the ways in which sexual challenges have been
dealt with in the case of homosexuality may be helpful. Interestingly,
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there is some historical evidence suggesting that the prevalence of sexual
relationships in mixed units has not always been problematic. The introduction of women into British anti-aircraft batteries in World War II was
accompanied by moral panic about the prospect of sexual fraternization,
but to the surprise of many skeptics, it was a nonissue (D'Ann Campbell,
“Women in Combat,” The Journal of Military History 57, no. 2).
In researching how it became possible to reverse the almost universal
military practice of excluding women from combat, we can hypothesize
that two things had to change: the way civilian society viewed gender
and the way the military viewed gender. Clearly, the interplay between
the two is essential in explaining how US Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta was able to make his momentous announcement in January
2013. A promising avenue for future research is, thus, considering this
question from a comparative perspective. Other inquiries along these
lines include: Is it possible to maintain all-male combat forces in societies where gender equality has rapidly advanced? How has that rapid
advance affected the identity of the military as well as its practices?
To an extent, gender integration in the military in Western societies
has been an inevitable consequence of the onward march of gender equality. But the process has been accelerated by changes on the battlefield.
The nature of contemporary combat has rendered the divisions
between frontline combat roles and rearguard roles a fiction. In reality,
although designated combat positions remained closed to women,
women have been engaging in combat, and have been casualties of
combat, as all three authors correctly note. Another question for future
research is, therefore, how the “fig leaf” of American policy was allowed
to obscure reality for so long. Why make the pretense that women were
somehow not engaged in combat? Feminist scholarship on international
security and on the specific question of gender integration has some
interesting answers to these questions, and the absence of this scholarship is one of the few faults in such an interesting collection of articles.
King discusses the association between concepts of masculinity and the
military. Without understanding the way the military has evolved as a
masculinized institution, and the role gender politics plays in it, it is very
difficult to understand the degree of resistance towards opening combat
positions to women. This is especially true because the reality of physical
testing means very few women will enter some combat roles.
Engel, however, makes the interesting point that perhaps these
physical tests also ought to change, as physical strength is not the only
useful requirement for a soldier in a world where combat, particularly
counterinsurgency, requires other skills. Haring and King also point out
that women will bring different skills to the table and these skills may be
essential in conducting the types of war militaries now face. But are these
changes entirely due to the changing nature of war, or do they reflect
something we already know about the effectiveness of mixed gender
groups in broader society? In other words, we know that, when confronting any problem, there may be benefits to using both men and women.
Finally, it is clear that changes on the battlefield have also facilitated
the ability of states to open combat roles to women. The blurring of
lines between combat and noncombat roles, and the necessity of using
women in certain types of counterinsurgency operations, forced the
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hands of policymakers. The idea that a woman could be a combat soldier
would be unthinkable without advances in gender equality; however, the
reality that women were already acting as combat troops in all but name
brought the change to fruition.

On “Women in Battle”
Megan H. MacKenzie
This commentary is in response to the featured articles “The Female Soldier” by Anthony
C. King; “What Women Bring to the Fight” by Ellen L. Haring; and “Gender
Perspectives and Fighting” by Robert Egnell published in the Summer 2013 issue of
Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2).

T
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hree questions dominate the articles by Haring, Egnell, and King
on women in combat:
•• Will the inclusion of women impact military cohesion and
culture?
•• Can and should women be required to meet the physical standards
required for combat roles?
•• Do women improve or diminish troop readiness and effectiveness?
While the authors raise important points related to these questions,
there is plenty of room to push the discussion further and to move
beyond “can they” and “should they” questions towards a more frank
discussion of women’s current and historical contributions to warfare,
the drawbacks to military cohesion, signs of the need to revise military
culture, as well as gender issues within the military that the removal of
the combat exclusion will certainly not solve.
All three authors address what has become a central concern related
to women and combat: physical standards. The authors cover the most
significant arguments on both sides of this debate. King argues that
women will need to prove themselves against existing standards “just
as ethnic minorities and gay men have,” while Egnell and Haring point
to both the gendered nature of the standards and their potential antiquatedness given the changes to modern warfare. Haring makes an
often-overlooked point that should make this debate mute—there are, in
fact, no established set of occupational standards for combat.
In terms of military cohesion and culture, it is encouraging to see
Egnell and Haring question both the nature of military cohesion and the
presumption that current military culture requires preservation rather
than revision. King ascribes some of the most disappointing arguments
relevant to this discussion. In particular, King gives credence to van
Creveld and Kingsley Browne’s position that the military is an inherently masculine institution that has, and will continue to be, corrupted
and weakened by the inclusion of women. It is perplexing that Martin
van Creveld continues to be called on as an expert when it comes to
women in combat. Van Creveld established his position on women in
2000 when he stated that war was “an assertion—the supreme assertion—of masculinity” and that women inherently diminish the core
qualities of an effective military (Martin van Creveld, "Less than we
can be: Men, Women and the Modern Military" Journal of Strategic Studies
23, no. 2). Since then, van Creveld has cherry picked research to support
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this opinion. Scholarship based on the premise that women are inherently inferior to men in any other venue would be described as sexist;
the hesitation to give van Creveld’s work this classification continues to
baffle me. In my view, when it comes to debates on women in combat
van Creveld’s work should be treated as editorializing at best, with much
of the content trending towards sexist polemic.
There is extensive research indicating that women do not negatively impact military culture and cohesion (Women Content in Units: Force
Development Test [MAX WAC]). Moreover, Egnell and Haring hint that
current military culture may require revision rather than preservation.
In doing so, they raise an important question: would it necessarily be
detrimental if the current military culture were altered? Given that the
last decade of US war operations has included low points such as the Abu
Ghraib abuses, images of soldiers urinating on corpses, record suicide
rates, and a rampant sexual violence epidemic, the negative aspects of
group cohesion and the potential need for cultural evolution within the
forces should be taken more seriously.
When it comes to physical standards and military culture, there is
a potential to talk in circles. This stagnation is particularly surprising
for three reasons: first, women were de facto serving in combat roles
long before the restriction was lifted. Women have been going through
combat training since 2003 and by January 2013, more than 280,000
women had served in Iraq and Afghanistan, with hundreds receiving
Combat Action Badges. The US military has carved out specialized roles
for women in combat in the form of Female Engagement Teams (FETs)
and has recognized women’s roles in combat operations by providing
combat pay to some of these women. Among the women who died in
Iraq, 78 percent of the deaths were categorized as “hostile,” providing
evidence that women are putting their lives at risk in war.
In addition to acknowledging women’s existing contributions to
war, it should be remembered that the United States is certainly not
breaking new ground by including women in combat; as such, rather
than blind speculation, important lessons can be learned about women
and combat and gender integration from countries that have already
opened combat positions to women. Finally, those focused on women in
combat should be reminded there are other important gender issues to
be addressed within the military. Opening combat positions to women
will not “solve” broader gender concerns such as discrimination, hypermasculine culture, or the sexual violence epidemic. Any discussion of
gender equality or women’s empowerment within the US military must
include a frank discussion of sexual violence within the forces.
In addition to sexual violence, the military must address the
“macho” culture of the military and its historic problem with retaining
women and promoting them to leadership positions. King identifies
sexual attraction, pregnancy, and fraternization as “problems” that will
continue to serve as obstacles to full gender integration (it is interesting
to note that these issues are only ever obstacles for women, though they
tend to involve both a man and woman). Such assertions indicate we
have a long way to go when it comes to defining gender equality within
the forces. The argument that men and women cannot control their
sexual urges in close confines is largely insulting to men and presumes
that the US military is unable to maintain professional standards in its
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ranks. King's vague, romanticized, and generalized remarks about West
African (where in West Africa? when?) troops that forced women to
swear to celibacy is confusing and inappropriate for current discussions
about pregnancy in the forces. Women get pregnant and this is a fact
that has been dealt with in other occupations; moreover, both sexes in
the military can become parents and still do their jobs. Celibacy has yet
to be considered for male troops.
Like it or not, women have been and will continue to serve in combat
positions. What remains to be seen is whether the US military can learn
from its international peers and accept that gender integration should
challenge the core identity and culture of the institution.

The Author Replies
Anthony C. King

I

t is widely acknowledged that the only people whom revolutionaries despise more than their political enemies are rival radical groups
with ostensibly similar goals. Some of Lenin’s most acidic vitriol was
directed not at Tsar Nicholas and the Whites but at the “renegade” Karl
Kautsky: as a socialist, he was insufficiently communist. Reading Megan
MacKenzie’s response to my article on the possibility of women’s accession to combat roles, I begin to empathize with Kautsky. I seem to have
been interpreted as a masculinist opponent of female integration into
the combat arms because I sought to engage with the polemical works
of Martin van Creveld and Kingsley Browne and then identified a series
of issues which female integration over the past decade has raised. I
am accused of making “vague, romanticized, and generalized remarks”
and that I “ascribe [to] some of the most disappointing arguments.” To
confirm: my article was explicitly intended to outline the real possibility
of female integration which now exists and to suggest some conditions
which should be met to ensure it is successful—for the female soldiers
who choose combat roles and for the armed forces. It was not intended
to oppose Panetta’s decision to extend full accession to women but to
facilitate it.
Nevertheless, the misunderstanding is useful in that it provides
an opportunity to clarify the issues which MacKenzie raises about my
comments on physical standards and sexuality. She complains that my
observation that women have to pass the same physical standards as men
to serve in the infantry may be a surreptitious attempt to exclude them.
On the contrary, both female and male soldiers who have served in
combat have emphasized the requirement for equal standards; trust and
professional credibility depend upon it. Crucially, although only a small
minority of women are likely to meet the criteria for ground combat
duties, the fact that objective standards apply to both men and women
has been found liberating by female soldiers. The institution of generic
professional standards ensures they are no longer prejudged as women
but assessed by what they can do as soldiers.
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MacKenzie is right to suggest that masculine norms can and have
infected the definition of military standards. There are numerous
examples when male soldiers have not been able to apply the same professional standards to men and to women. Female soldiers are regularly
discriminated against so that performances, which would be judged as
entirely competent if the soldier were a man, are unfairly denigrated.
The additional research, which both MacKenzie and Sarah Percy call
for, might identify arbitrary forms of discrimination like this with a view
to eliminating it. This research, however, is unlikely to disprove the
need for equal standards. On the contrary, it appears predicated on an
assumption that standards should be genuinely universal and are the
route to less gendered military.
MacKenzie is also critical of my discussion of sex in combat units.
She raises an important point about which I seem unwittingly to have
been insufficiently clear. It is easy to assume that because sex potentially
undermines cohesion in combat units, women (having apparently introduced sexuality) are the problem. On the contrary, as MacKenzie rightly
maintains, it is as much—if not normally more—the fault of male soldiers if fraternization occurs and it is only the masculinized culture of the
armed forces which allows women, and only women, to be blamed and,
indeed, vilified for any sexual misconduct which does occur. Although
MacKenzie appears to have ignored it, I explicitly stated all this in my
article and concluded that a divisive double standard is at work which
needs to be addressed (page 23). Nevertheless, the identification of this
double standard does not disprove the point, affirmed by both male and
female soldiers, that heterosexual relations between serving personnel
in the same combat unit tend to undermine discipline and cohesion. Sex
alters the relations between the males and females involved and between
them and the rest of their unit.
My article was not then an argument against integration, as
MacKenzie presumes. The challenge in the coming decade is to create a
sufficiently professional ethos in the armed forces to ensure these issues
are addressed coherently and honestly so those women who are willing
and able to serve in the combat arms are able to contribute fully to those
services. The purpose of my article was to make some small contribution
to that end.

The Author Replies
Ellen L. Haring

B

oth MacKenzie and Percy rightly point out that there has been
little empirical research in the area of women combatants. This
is extraordinary given that most of the literature in the 1990s
predicted that the distinction between front lines and rear echelons would
largely disappear. Over the last decade, in fact, women were consistently
engaged in combat operations.
While individual research efforts have been enlightening, they have
only been able to scratch the surface of what should have been a series
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of research studies on this topic. Presently, the military departments
are conducting research relative to validating or establishing genderfree occupational standards. Yet, much more remains to be done. The
commentators have highlighted a number of fruitful avenues for future
research, and the US military would do well to support those avenues by
increasing its funding opportunities for researchers and by permitting
greater access to test populations.

